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Rights in the Age of Identity Politics
AVIGAIL EISENBERG *
In 1982, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was entrenched in the Constitution at the height 
of what has come to be known as an era of identity politics. The infl uence of identity politics 
on Canadian jurisprudence is evident both in some of the specific rights entrenched in 
the Charter and in the manner these rights have been interpreted. This paper examines 
two approaches to Charter interpretation that use the resources of identity politics. On the 
identity approach, claims individuals and groups make about their identities in the course 
of advancing rights claims are treated as immutable, non-negotiable facts, rather than as 
contingent attributes grounded in their choices. The identity approach has been fruitfully 
used to trace discrimination and historical injustice against groups. On the reasonable 
accommodation approach, courts determine whether specifi c practices of ethnic and cultural 
minorities can be accommodated in particular contexts, such as schools or the workplace, 
without imposing undue hardship on the providers of education or employment. Reasonable 
accommodation can effectively call into question seemingly neutral rules and standards and 
expose their biases against minority groups. Although both of these approaches have 
merits, they also carry risks for minorities. To address these risks, institutions should 
adopt policies that both encourage “institutional humility” and create viable democratic spaces 
for minorities to participate in the processes in which the representation and assessment of 
their identities are at issue.
En 1982, la Charte des droits et libertés a été enchâssée dans la Constitution à l’apogée 
de ce que l’on pourrait appeler l’ère revendicatrice des groupes marginaux. L’influence 
de ces revendications sur la jurisprudence canadienne apparaît tant dans certains droits 
particuliers qui ont  été enchâssés dans la Charte que dans la manière dont on a interprété ces 
droits. Cet article examine deux approches permettant d’interpréter les droits de la Charte 
qui procèdent des revendications des groupes marginaux. Selon l’approche identitaire, les 
revendications des particuliers et des groupes fondées sur leur identité dans le but de faire 
valoir leurs droits sont traitées comme des faits immuables et non négociables, plutôt que 
comme attributs découlant de leurs choix. L’approche identitaire a été utilisée avec succès 
* Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria. An earlier version of this 
article was presented at the inaugural Osgoode Hall Law Journal Symposium, “Canada’s 
Rights Revolution: A Critical and Comparative Symposium on the Canadian Charter,” 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto (14 September 2012). My thanks to 
Benjamin Berger, Jamie Cameron, Bruce Ryder, symposium participants, and the anonymous 
referees for their insightful and helpful comments
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pour retracer la discrimination et l’injustice historique à l’encontre de certains groupes. 
Selon l’approche des accommodements raisonnables, les tribunaux déterminent s’il est 
possible d’accommoder certaines pratiques des minorités ethniques et culturelles dans des 
contextes particuliers, notamment ceux de l’écoles ou du lieu de travail, sans imposer de 
préjudice injustifi é aux établissements scolaires ou aux employeurs. Les accommodements 
raisonnables peuvent en effet remettre en question des règles et des normes apparemment 
neutres et exposer les préjugés qu’elles véhiculent à l’encontre de groupes minoritaires. 
Bien que ces approches aient chacune ses mérites, elles comportent également certains ris-
ques pour les minorités et il est essentiel que les institutions apprennent à mieux aborder 
ces risques. Aborder ces risques signifi e adopter des politiques qui à la fois favorisent l’« 
humilité institutionnelle » et créent un espace démocratique viable pour permettre aux 
minorités de participer aux processus dans lesquels la représentation et l’évaluation de leur 
identité est en cause.
WHILE RELIGIOUS CONFLICT is not new to democracies in the West, the last 
three decades have witnessed an increase in such confl icts and an intensifi cation 
of struggles between minority groups and the state. During this time a diverse 
array of groups has become mobilized and politicized on the basis of features of 
identity such as gender, race, language, ethnicity, indigeneity, religion, disability, 
and sexuality, and they have made claims for protection or accommodation of 
their identity before national and international courts. Although there is nothing 
new about political struggles in which groups contest their status or demand 
that the state recognize some aspect of their identity, the last three decades 
have witnessed an increase in such confl icts in the West and an intensifi cation of 
struggles between minority groups and the state. Indigenous peoples have mobilized 
increasingly on the basis of Indigenous identity and have advanced claims at the 
international and domestic levels to seek recognition of their distinctive cul-
tures and to secure land and other resources needed to protect their ways of 
life.1 Religious minorities have mobilized to contest the terms of their access to 
1. Studies that explore identity politics in the context of Indigenous struggles include: Courtney 
Jung, Th e Moral Force of Indigenous Politics: Critical Liberalism and the Zapatistas (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating 
the New International Politics of Diversity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Tim 
Schouls, Shifting Boundaries: Aboriginal Identity, Pluralist Th eory, and the Politics of Self-
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the benefi ts of citizenship by engaging in debates about the legal recognition 
of religious arbitration, prohibitions on wearing headscarves and kirpans (Sikh 
ceremonial knives), the censorship of blasphemous cartoons, and the criminal-
ization of polygamy, to name just a few examples.2 In the context of some of 
these struggles, minorities have argued that the protection and accommodation 
Government (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); Donna Lee Van Cott, Th e Friendly Liquidation 
of the Past: Th e Politics of Diversity in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2000). See also Avigail Eisenberg, “Domestic and International Norms for Assessing 
Indigenous Identity” in Avigail Eisenberg & Will Kymlicka, eds, Identity Politics in the 
Public Realm: Bringing Institutions Back In (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), ch 6 at 137; 
Juliet Hooker, “Indigenous Rights in Latin America: How to Classify Afro-Descendants?” 
in ibid, ch 5 at 104; and Villia Jefremovas & Padmapani L Perez, “Defi ning Indigeneity: 
Representation and the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 in the Philippines” in ibid, 
ch 4 at 79. 
2. On religious arbitration in Canada, see Marion Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: 
Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, 
2004), online: <www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd>; Anna C 
Korteweg & Jennifer A Selby, eds, Debating Sharia: Islam, Gender Politics, and Family Law 
Arbitration (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). Debates about prohibitions 
on wearing headscarves are explored by Natasha Bakht, “Objection, Your Honour! 
Accommodating Niqab-Wearing Women in Courtrooms” in Ralph Grillo et al, eds, Legal 
Practice and Cultural Diversity (London, UK: Ashgate, 2009) at 115; John R Bowen, Why 
the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007); Joan Wallach Scott, Th e Politics of the Veil (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007). See also R v NS, 2012 SCC 72, 290 CCC (3d) 404. Th is case dealt 
with accommodation of veiling in the context of criminal trials. Th e kirpan controversy 
in Quebec schools was central to the Report of the Bouchard-Taylor commission. See 
Quebec, Commission de Consultation sur les Pratiques d’Accommodement Reliées aux 
Diff érences Culturelles, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation (Quebec City: 
Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Diff erences, 
2008) (Gérard Bouchard & Charles Taylor) at 33 [Building the Future], online: <http://
www.accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/rapports/rapport-fi nal-integral-en.pdf>. 
See also Multani v Marguerite-Bourgeoys (Commission scolaire), 2006 SCC 6, 1 SCR 256 
[Multani]. For discussions of the Report and the Supreme Court decision see, Jean-
Francois Gaudreault-DesBiens, “Religious Challenges to the Secularized Identity of an 
Insecure Polity: A Tentative Sociology of Québec’s ‘Reasonable Accommodation’ Debate” 
in Ralph Grillo et al, (ibid) at 151. Th e Danish Cartoon Aff air is examined in Jytte 
Klausen, Th e Cartoons that Shook the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). See 
also Cécile Laborde et al, “Review Symposium: Th e Danish Cartoon Controversy – Th e 
Danish Cartoon Controversy and the Challenges of Multicultural Politics” (2011) 9:3 
Perspectives on Politics 603. Debates about the criminalization of polygamy are explored 
by Sarah Carter, Th e Importance of Being Monogamous: Marriage and Nation Building in 
Western Canada to 1915 (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2008) and, in a more 
contemporary context, in Lori Beaman & Gillian Calder, eds, Polygamy’s Rights and Wrongs 
(Vancouver: UBC Press [forthcoming in 2013]).  
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of some aspect of their distinctive identity is a requirement of justice and a 
means of realizing the democratic values of contemporary nation-states.
In Canada, the era of identity politics coincides with the entrenchment of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 (Charter). Since 1982, the Charter has extended 
constitutional protection to legal and political rights, many of which relate to 
features of individual and group identity. For instance, section 15 of the Charter 
guarantees equality on the basis of several identity categories including sex, race, 
ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and disability; sections 16–22 recognize the 
linguistic rights of French and English minorities; and section 27 requires rights to 
be interpreted in a manner consistent with the multicultural nature of Canadian 
society. Many Charter scholars were initially hopeful that a constitution sensitive 
to these kinds of identity and group diff erences would promote an expansive 
set of rights for vulnerable groups and would have a democratizing eff ect on 
constitutionalism in Canada.4 Yet for judges and legislators, who must respond 
to identity claims in the public sphere, the challenge has been to translate 
the abstract values of multiculturalism and identity-based rights into practical 
and applicable terms. Th e challenges of translating the Charter’s principles 
into practice have proven especially diffi  cult in cases that invoke identity-based 
claims. A growing number of legal and political scholars see identity politics as 
generating group-based claims to non-rational, non-negotiable attachments that 
can distort the protection of rights and freedoms and worsen the position of 
minorities whom these claims are meant to help.5 Whereas some scholars remain 
3. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B of the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
4. Th e Charter initially generated several critical assessments as well, beginning with Keith 
Banting & Richard Simeon, eds, And No One Cheered (Agincourt, Ont: Methuen, 1983); 
Michael Mandel, Th e Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: 
Wall & Th ompson, 1989); Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). Th ese works all quickly became basic reading 
for scholars interested in Charter politics. More optimistic accounts of the Charter’s impact 
on minority rights can be found in Alan C Cairns, Charter versus Federalism: Th e Dilemmas 
of Constitutional Reform (Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press, 1992); and Gregory 
Hein, “Interest Group Litigation and Canadian Democracy” (2000) 6:2 Choices 3.
5. On the non-negotiable and essentializing nature of identity claims in the context of legal and 
political decision making, see Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007) at 48-53 [Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture]. On 
the non-rational nature of identity claims and the risk that identity claims can undermine 
democratic values, see Daniel Weinstock, “Is Identity a Danger to Democracy?” in Igor 
Primoratz & Aleksandar Pavković, eds, Identity, Self-determination and Secession (Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate, 2006) 15. For more on the risk that identity claims can undermine democratic 
values, see Monique Deveaux, Gender and Justice in Multicultural Liberal States (Oxford: 
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optimistic about the role that identity claims can play in challenging the sometimes 
narrow, legalistic interpretations of Charter rights, the view of identity that is 
generally refl ected in the practice of law and in politics has provided political and 
legal actors with reasons to hesitate before venturing down the path of identity 
politics in advancing claims under the Charter. 
In this article, I assess the risks and benefi ts of approaches to Charter rights 
that employ the resources of identity politics. Two such approaches have been 
defended as helpful and revealing ways of understanding and advancing the 
fair treatment of minorities: 1) the “identity approach” and 2) “reasonable 
accommodation.” Th e fi rst section explains these approaches and shows that, 
while they provide eff ective means to address legitimate claims to injustice, they 
may also lead to serious risks for minority groups. Th e second section examines 
whether these risks are surmountable, and the third section explores two policy 
frameworks, which I label “institutional humility” and “democratic space,” that 
can help minimize these risks. Th ese two frameworks aim to increase the capacities 
of public institutions to respond to the risks of identity politics by enhancing the 
transparency and accountability of decision-making processes and by providing 
opportunities for minorities to challenge hegemonic presumptions about appro-
priate responses to their identity claims.
I. TWO IDENTITY APPROACHES TO CHARTER RIGHTS
A. THE IDENTITY APPROACH
One benefi t associated with identity politics is that the attachments people have 
to ethnicity, religion, language, and so forth can track social exclusion and 
institutional bias and thereby provide a way of exposing the injustices suff ered by 
particular groups to the scrutiny of judges and other agents of public institutions. 
Identity-based attachments can point to rules and processes that are represented 
as neutral but that have the eff ect of disadvantaging and marginalizing particular 
minorities.6 Th e failure of states to recognize identity-based attachments can 
Oxford University Press, 2006) and Jeremy Waldron “Cultural Identity and Civic 
Responsibility” in Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, eds, Citizenship in Diverse Societies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 155. 
6. On the false neutrality of some legal and political norms for cultural minorities, see Kwame 
Anthony Appiah, Th e Ethics of Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) at 
88-99; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Th eory of Minority Rights (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995) at 108-15 [Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship]; David 
Miller, “Liberalism, Equal Opportunities and Cultural Commitments” in Paul Kelly, ed, 
Multiculturalism Reconsidered: ‘Culture and Equality’ and its Critics (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
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entrench group disadvantage and is sometimes experienced as a form of disrespect 
by group members.7 For these reasons, several political philosophers have been 
sympathetic to at least some manifestations of identity politics and have argued 
for approaches to legal and political decision making that enhance the just and 
fair treatment of minorities through a sensitivity to identity claims.8 
But several studies have also shown that, in real-world settings, identity 
claims fall short of their emancipatory promise. For instance, legal scholarship 
shows that courts have failed to assess identity claims fairly or in ways that 
are helpful in revealing valid concerns about discrimination and disadvantage 
towards particular groups.9 Sometimes this failure results from judges relying 
too heavily on conservative notions about group identities that are already 
entrenched in law and politics. Furthermore, legal processes rely too heavily on 
the discretion of judges who are overwhelmingly members of the majority elite 
and whose perspectives may refl ect broader public stereotypes and misinformation 
about minorities. Where these conservative attitudes are uncontested, the risk is 
that legal reasoning that is sensitive to identity claims may be less sensitive to the 
interests of dissenting and marginalized members of minority groups. Th e aim of 
identity-based claims is to broaden the kind of arguments that can be advanced 
by minorities and to require that public decision makers become more sensitive 
to legitimate cultural and religious diff erences; however, the actual result may be 
Press, 2002) 45. More generally, see James Tully, Strange multiplicity: Constitutionalism in 
an age of diversity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Charles Taylor, 
“Th e Politics of Recognition” in Charles Taylor et al, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics 
of Recognition, expanded ed by Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 
(providing arguments critical of liberal and procedural neutrality). 
7. On the relation between respect and identity politics, see David Copp “Social Unity and the 
Identity of Persons” (2002) 10:4 J of Political Phil 365; Avigail Eisenberg, Reasons of Identity: 
A Normative Guide to the Political and Legal Assessment of Identity Claims (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2009) 28-32 [Eisenberg, Reasons of Identity]; and Margaret Moore, 
“Identity Claims and Identity Politics: A Limited Defence” in Primoratz & Pavković, supra 
note 5, 27. See also Taylor, ibid at 41-43.
8. See e.g. Appiah, supra note 6; Eisenberg, Reasons of Identity, ibid; Amy Gutmann, Identity 
in Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Kymlicka, Multicultural 
Citizenship, supra note 6; Taylor, supra note 6; Tully, supra note 6.  
9. Studies focused on the shortcomings of courts in assessing identity claims include Richard 
T Ford, Racial Culture: A Critique (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Pascale 
Fournier, “Th e Ghettoisation of Diff erence in Canada: ‘Rape by Culture’ and the Danger of 
a ‘Culture Defence’ in Criminal Law Trials” (2002) 29:1 Man LJ 81; Anne Phillips, “When 
Culture Means Gender: Issues of Cultural Defense in the English Courts” (2003) 66 Mod L 
Rev 510; Alison Dundes Renteln, Th e Cultural Defense (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004); Leti Volpp, “Blaming Culture for Bad Behaviour” (2000) 12:1 Yale JL & Human 89.
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to deepen stereotypes about group identities and entrench hierarchies, such as 
patriarchy, within groups that make such claims.10 
Th e risk that judges or legislators will accept identity claims that distort a 
group’s identity11 or defi ne that identity in a manner that discriminates against 
a subset of group members can be especially great when identity claims are 
accepted by courts to be immutable, static, and non-negotiable facts about a 
group and when these claims cannot be subject to appropriate critical assess-
ment. Th is is the risk of what has recently been called an “identity approach” to 
religious freedom in Canada. As Richard Moon describes,12 under the identity 
approach to Charter rights developed by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), 
judges accept individual attachments to religious beliefs and practices as immu-
table; religious beliefs and attachments thereby become a basis upon which the 
law may not discriminate. On Moon’s account, since the entrenchment of the 
Charter, courts have changed their approach to religious freedom from one that 
is sensitive to protecting individual choice to one that accepts religion as an es-
tablished fact about the individual and prohibits discrimination on this basis. 
When religious commitments are understood to be personal choices, the law’s 
10. Th e entrenchment of elite hierarchies, including patriarchy, in the context of identity 
politics is discussed by Deveaux, supra note 5; Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture, 
supra note 5; Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Diff erences and Women’s 
Rights (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Sarah Song, Justice, Gender, 
and the Politics of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
Jeff  Spinner-Halev, “Feminism, Multiculturalism, Oppression and the State” (2001) 112:1 
Ethics 84. For a discussion of the interplay between the ideals and real-world manifestations 
of identity politics, see Avigail Eisenberg & Will Kymlicka, “Bringing Institutions Back In: 
How Public Institutions Assess Identity” in Avigail Eisenberg & Will Kymlicka, supra note 1, 
ch 1 at 1.
11. Several scholars of Aboriginal rights in Canada worry that, beginning with R v Van der Peet, 
the Court has reduced Aboriginal rights to claims for the protection of distinctive cultural 
practices (such as fi shing for salmon, harvesting trees to make furniture, hunting moose) 
rather than broader claims for jurisdictional authority or self-determination: R v Van der Peet, 
[1996] 2 SCR 507, 9 WWR 1. Th e “distinctive culture test” adopted by the Court in Van der 
Peet has been criticized for imposing narrow and static understandings of Indigenous culture 
that link the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal rights to the continued adherence 
of communities to these distinctive practices. See Gordon Christie, “Aboriginal Rights, 
Aboriginal Culture, and Protection” (1998) 36:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 447; John Borrows, 
“Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster” (1997-98) 22 Am 
Indian L Rev 37. 
12. See “Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem” (2005) 29 Sup 
Ct L Rev (2d) 201; “Government Support for Religious Practice” in Richard Moon, 
ed, Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 217 [Moon, 
“Government Support”]. 
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aim is to protect individuals in choosing to follow their religious beliefs even if, 
sometimes, individuals must absorb the costs of their choices. To use Moon’s 
example, according to the choice approach, the Lord’s Day Act, which required 
all businesses to close on Sunday until it was struck down in 1985,13 did not 
violate religious freedom because it did not prohibit those who believe Saturday 
or Friday to be the Sabbath from closing their businesses on these other days as 
well, even though the choice to follow their religious commitments imposed 
additional costs on them.14 
In contrast to the choice approach, when religious commitments are treated as 
matters of identity—that is, as immutable, static, involuntary, and non-negotiable—
they become features of a person that the law must respect in order to treat people 
as equals.15 When religious commitments are viewed as expressions of one’s identity, 
a law that privileges the practices of one religious group over others (such as a 
law that requires businesses to close on Sundays) may violate religious freedom if 
it exposes individuals to disrespect or disadvantage, or if it denies them dignity 
as members of a particular group.16 As Moon puts it, if religious belief is part of 
the individual’s identity, “then its unequal treatment may be experienced by the 
individual as an interference with his dignity and as a failure to treat him and his 
identity group with equal respect.”17
Th e benefi t of what Moon calls an identity approach is that it can track 
social exclusion and historical injustice towards minority groups18 in a way 
that an approach focused on protecting individual choice cannot. In part, this is 
because an identity approach treats identity as somewhat static and immutable 
and thereby accepts as emblematic of identity a particular group practice, belief, 
or commitment. Th e approach then uses that practice, belief, or commitment 
to trace discrimination against the group to which the individual belongs. We 
can see this connection being drawn between the restriction of a group practice 
13. Th e Lord’s Day Act was struck down in R v Big M Drug Mart. See Lord’s Day Act, RSC 1970, 
c L13; and R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295, 18 DLR (4th) 321 [Big M Drug Mart 
cited to SCR].
14. Moon, “Government Support,” supra note 12 at 222-27. For a philosophical defense of 
a choice-centred approach to cultural and religious diversity, see Brian Barry, Culture and 
Equality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).
15. See also Waldron, supra note 5 and Weinstock, supra note 5.  
16. Moon, “Government Support,” supra note 12 at 232.
17. Ibid.
18. Whereas Moon focuses on the claims of religious minorities, a shift to an identity approach 
in legal and political advocacy by people with disabilities on the subject of Charter rights has 
also been documented. See Lisa Vanhala, Making Rights a Reality?: Disability Rights Activists 
and Legal Mobilization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) ch 2 at 57. 
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and damage to a group’s identity in numerous cases in which groups contest 
legal restrictions on the grounds of religious freedom. For example, in a recent 
reference case about the criminal prohibition of polygamy,19 the Fundamentalist 
Latter Day Saints (FLDS) in Bountiful, British Columbia presented evidence 
to show that the criminal prohibition of polygamy has been used historically 
as a tool by the state to expose members of their community to disrespect and 
discrimination. Th e FLDS community submitted historical, political, and 
sociological evidence to show that the criminal law prohibiting polygamy was 
initially designed to dissuade the break-off  Mormon sect from immigrating to 
Canada, and was then used to stigmatize, marginalize, and exclude the group 
from the benefi ts of citizenship in Canada and the United States. Women in the 
community stated in interviews that, even if they choose not to enter a polygamous 
marriage, they feel stigmatized by the law—as do all the other members of their 
community. On their view, the criminal prohibition exposes all members of the 
community to disrespect by prohibiting a practice that is emblematic of the 
group’s identity.20 Whereas the criminal prohibition impedes individuals in the 
community from choosing to follow one of their religious commitments, the 
injustice the community claims to experience is not simply a matter of having the 
choices of their members restricted. Th e prohibition of polygamy today fi ts into 
a group-based history of social exclusion and a narrative of persecution that is far 
more profound to the group’s sense of dignity than what a snapshot assessment 
of individual choice reveals. 
So, whereas social exclusion and discrimination are considered unjust only 
because they are experienced by individuals, an identity approach connects 
individuals to groups through collective practices and, through these group 
practices, to a history from which structural injustices embedded in histories 
of exclusion can be exposed where they would otherwise be obscured by focus-
ing on individuals here and now. On this view, consider the argument made by 
some Muslims that the publication of cartoon depictions of Muhammed by Jyl-
lands Posten in 2005 was unjust because it violated the religious sensibilities of 
Muslim individuals that prohibit reproducing images of the prophet (let alone 
profane ones).21 Th is rationale provides what several commentators considered to 
19. Reference Re Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, 28 BCLR 
(5th) 96.
20. Angela Campbell, “Bountiful Voices” (2009) 47:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 183 at 221. Campbell 
was one of the witnesses called during the reference case.
21. Th e cartoons were published by Jyllands Posten on 30 September 2005 and then reproduced 
in dozens of newspapers, magazines, and websites worldwide. For scholarship that considers 
Muslim perspectives on the cartoon aff air, see Tariq Modood, “Th e Liberal Dilemma: 
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be a weak case for the legal censorship of the cartoons because, after all, many 
publications off end individual religious sensibilities, and those who are truly 
off ended can choose to avoid reading or seeing the off ensive material.22 And yet, 
a stronger case against publishing the cartoons might have been made on the 
basis of group identity, claiming that publishing the cartoons is disrespectful to 
Muslims and that free speech ought not to be exercised in ways that ignore (if not 
ridicule) distinctively Muslim sensitivities.23 While the identity-based argument in 
this case may not provide a rationale for legally prohibiting publication, it helps 
to reveal a compelling moral reason, based on group identity, why the cartoons 
ought not to be published. Th is moral reason clarifi es that part of what is at stake 
in this case is a collective experience; this collective element illuminates why the 
publisher’s refusal to refl ect on these factors marginalized some Muslims and was 
experienced, collectively, as a form of disrespect.24 Even though injustice in this case 
is said to exist only because of how individuals are aff ected by the publication of the 
cartoons, the argument that an injustice has occurred rests in part on evidence 
that shows a history of discrimination and disrespect in the West against Muslims 
as a group. 
Th ese examples illustrate that, in many contexts, a policy or rule can be 
considered unjust not only because it impairs an individual’s freedom to follow 
a religious practice or value that is meaningful to her, but also because the 
Integration or Vilifi cation?” (2006) 44:5 Int’l Migration 4. Saba Mahmood also presents an 
account of what is at stake morally and emotionally for a large number of Muslims in the 
Danish cartoon controversy. See “Religious Reason and Secular Aff ect: An Incommensurable 
Divide?” (2009) 35:4 Critical Inquiry 836.
22. For diff erent perspectives on the case, see the special issue of the International Migration 
journal: Tariq Modood et al, “Th e Danish Cartoon Aff air: Free Speech, Racism, Islamism 
and Integration” (2006) 44:5 Int’l Migration 3.
23. Modood, supra note 21 at 4-7; Joseph H Carens, “Free Speech and Democratic Norms in the 
Danish Cartoons Controversy” in Modood et al, ibid at 33-42.
24. Th e protection of free speech may, nevertheless, be justifi ed even where such group-based 
considerations are taken seriously. Th e point here is that, if a convincing case can be made for 
restricting the cartoons on the basis of religious freedom, such a case requires an assessment 
that goes beyond individual sensitivities and considers the signifi cance and importance of the 
religious beliefs and practices of Muslims that are subject to disrespect and discrimination 
because of the cartoons. For two arguments that consider such a view, see Modood et al, 
supra note 22; Mahmood, supra note 21. See also Geoff rey Brahm Levey & Tariq Modood 
“Liberal Democracy, Multicultural Citizenship and the Danish Cartoon Aff air” in Geoff rey 
Brahm Levey & Tariq Modood, eds, Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 216 (arguing, correctly in my view, 
that the cartoon aff air is a dispute about how to interpret liberal values rather than only a 
struggle between liberal and Muslim values).
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restriction targets a religious group and marginalizes its members by exposing 
them to discrimination, disadvantage, and disrespect. Evidence about the 
meaning and importance of the practice to the group helps to illuminate this 
collective dimension, which can easily be overlooked by assessments that narrowly 
focus on whether an individual believer was free to choose. 
Yet at the same time as such an approach can illuminate group-based injustices, 
it also carries various risks. One risk is that if an identity approach treats a group’s 
identity as immutable, static, and non-negotiable, it can constrain individuals and 
groups by tying them to static understandings of their identities and, in some 
cases, by entrenching stereotypes about their identities or by deepening internal 
hierarchies that are associated with defi ning a group’s identity in particular 
ways. Th is can occur because of the conservatism or misinformation of those 
outside the group, such as judges or legislators, or because of the manner in 
which groups themselves present their claims. Because groups have a stake in 
how they are defi ned by outsiders, they can exacerbate this risk by exaggerating 
the importance of their practices or the unqualifi ed unity and uniformity of the 
group in the hopes that doing so will enhance their chances of winning legal 
recognition and protection for some aspect of their identity.25 Either way, an 
identity approach to rights carries the risk of one kind of essentialism, which is that 
the state or group actors will reinforce stereotypes about a group or static boundaries 
about who counts as a member (or a member in good standing) of the group in 
the course of legally validating particular collective practices or commitments 
as core and immutable features of a group’s identity.26  
25. Some advocates of religious arbitration in Ontario stated that “Muslims place their spiritual 
and social lives in dire peril because they are thus made to submit to that which is other 
than what Allah has ordained.” Syed Mumtaz Ali, “Th e Review of the Ontario Civil Justice 
System: Th e Reconstruction of the Canadian Constitution and Th e Case for Muslim 
Personal/Family Law” (Toronto: Canadian Society of Muslims, 1994) at 1, online: <http://
muslimcanada.org/submission.pdf> (Submission to the Ontario Civil Justice Review Task 
Force). Others viewed such statements as attempts to consolidate the Muslim community 
by infl ating the importance of particular practices and thereby marginalizing Muslims who 
did not adhere to those practices. For scholarship that considers this dynamic, see Anver M 
Emon, “Islamic Law and the Canadian Mosaic: Politics, Jurisprudence and Multicultural 
Accommodation” in Korteweg & Selby, eds, supra note 2 at 192. For an anthropological 
account of the problem of performativity or “self-essentialism” in the case of Indigenous 
claims, see Elizabeth A Povinelli, “Th e State of Shame: Australian Multiculturalism and the 
Crisis of Indigenous Citizenship” (1998) 24:2 Critical Inquiry 575.
26. For an elaboration of the risks of essentialism, see Eisenberg, Reasons of Identity, supra note 7 
at 61-62 and ch 6. 
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In addition to the risks of essentialism, identity-based claims can entrench the 
power of particular elites or elite hierarchies within groups. Again, sometimes this risk 
starts within groups—especially within vulnerable groups that are struggling against 
assimilation and fragmentation. Sometimes, group elites will defi ne a group’s 
identity and resist attempts by some members to develop more fl uid or hybrid 
notions of membership, which may more accurately refl ect the nature of people’s 
social attachments, in order to shield the group from assimilative pressure. Feminist 
scholarship on cultural rights points to numerous cases in which conservative 
group elites successfully use legal norms to protect sexist practices and patriarchal 
hierarchies—for instance, where elites seek legal recognition for religious rules of 
membership because, they claim, these rules are central to the religious identity 
of the group even though they disadvantage women.27 Religious practices that 
control women can seem especially important to keeping the community stable 
and preventing group fragmentation, which are important to protecting group 
identity.28 So group leaders may present particular religious commitments as 
central and integral to the group’s identity in order to defi ne the group and unite 
it in particular ways, thereby protecting a favoured understanding of the group’s 
identity while also protecting the leadership positions of a group of elites. 
In many of these cases, the risk of essentializing identity or entrenching 
hierarchies that increase the vulnerable status of women or other members of a 
group only arises if the group’s identity is defi ned in immutable and static ways. 
Where a group’s identity is publicly recognized to be pluralistic, fl uid, and hybrid 
it is much more diffi  cult for judges and other public decision makers outside 
the group to endorse conservative, essentialized, or stereotypical understandings 
about that identity; likewise, it is more diffi  cult for elites within the group to 
present the group’s identity as uniform and uncontested.29 Yet, sometimes, without 
these more static understandings of who counts as a member of the group or what 
27. Examples of practices that have been presented to courts as central to the cultural or religious 
identity of a group, but which are also patriarchal, include dowry practices in South Africa, 
the marrying out rule in Canada, polygamy, the get in Judaism, and shari’a law concerning 
divorce in Islam. For discussion of these and other examples, see Deveaux, supra note 5; 
Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture, supra note 5; Shachar, supra note 10; Song, 
supra note 10; Volpp, supra note 9. See also Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff  Spinner-Halev, 
eds, Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights, and Diversity (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005).  
28. Shachar, ibid.
29. Th e Ontario debates about religious arbitration provide an illustration of the impact that 
publicity can have on the ability of religious elites to defi ne religious identity statically for 
large groups. For an assessment of the identity politics in these debates, see Eisenberg, Reasons 
of Identity, supra note 7 at 45-51.
EISENBERG, IDENTITY POLITICS 621
practices are central and integral to the group’s identity, courts are unable to track 
the ways in which the group has been exposed to social exclusion or even to identify 
stable conceptions of the group itself. In short, the identity approach presents a 
dilemma insofar as it may have the eff ect both of providing public decision 
makers with the means to trace social exclusion and unjust treatment, and of 
essentializing groups and entrenching hierarchies, identities, and stereotypes. 
B. THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF IDENTITY
Another criticism commonly leveled against identity politics is that it encourages 
groups to advance claims in terms that, at best, promise minor adjustments of 
accommodation in the public sphere and fail to address deeper social problems such 
as racism, poverty, and dispossession. Identity politics is therefore sometimes 
viewed as a way of co-opting minorities rather than of addressing serious 
forms of injustice. States have been known to encourage groups to repackage 
their claims as cultural claims in order to make them easier and “safer” to address; 
but when groups respond to these incentives, they divert their resources from 
political struggles more directly relevant to their interests in order to enjoy 
at least some modicum of security and protection for their cultural or religious 
identity. Minorities are sometimes off ered symbolic recognition, or their 
leaders are given token positions of power and prestige, while ongoing social 
processes of discrimination and oppression continue unaddressed.30 In relation to 
Canadian multiculturalism, several critics have similarly argued that, in practice, 
multiculturalism is a form of window dressing that allows liberal states to present 
themselves as tolerant and welcoming of minorities while doing little to address 
the racism, unemployment, and poverty that adversely aff ect the lives of visible 
minorities today.31  
Th e problem associated with reasonable accommodation is that minorities will 
be co-opted by legal processes that encourage them to advance identity claims as 
a means to mount their struggles for justice. Th e requirement of reasonable 
accommodation entered Canadian law in the mid-1980s through human 
30. For further discussion of this “risk of co-optation,” see Eisenberg & Kymlicka, supra note 10 
at 5.
31. See e.g. Yasmeen Abu-Laban & Christina Gabriel, Selling Diversity: Immigration, 
Multiculturalism, Employment Equity, and Globalization (Peterborough, Ont: Broadview 
Press, 2002); Hamani Bannerji, The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, 
Nationalism and Gender (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2000); Gerald Kernerman, 
Multicultural Nationalism: Civilizing Diff erence, Constituting Community (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2005); Sherene H Razack, Casting Out: Th e Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and 
Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).
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rights cases about religious discrimination in the workplace.32 As a result of 
these cases, employers are required to adapt workplace rules and practices so as 
to accommodate the religious commitments of their employees within the limits 
of what is reasonable and short of undue hardship. As Bruce Ryder explains the 
principle, “Facially neutral rules that have adverse eff ects on the basis of creed 
or religion are a violation of the right to religious equality unless the employer 
has taken reasonable steps, up to the point of undue hardship, to accommodate 
religious observance.”33 In 1999, the principle received an expansive interpretation 
in Meiorin,34 a case about gender and fi tness tests for fi refi ghters, and Grismer,35 
which concerned standards of visional impairment and driver’s tests. More 
recently, the Court has reasserted a minimalist interpretation of reasonable 
accommodation.36 In 2006, the principle of reasonable accommodation was 
used in the Multani case, which dealt with whether Sikh students can be 
prohibited from wearing their kirpans (ceremonial swords or daggers) when they 
attend public schools.37 At the Supreme Court, the confl ict was framed as one 
32. See e.g. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Simpson Sears, [1985] 2 SCR 536, 23 DLR 
(4th) 321; Bhinder v CN, [1985] 2 SCR 561, 23 DLR (4th) 481 [Bhinder].
33. “Th e Canadian Conception of Equal Religious Citizenship” in Richard Moon, Law and 
Religious Pluralism, supra note 12, 87. 
34. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v BCGEU, [1999] 3 SCR 
3, 176 DLR (4th) 1 [Meiorin cited to SCR]. Here, the issue is whether a fi tness test for 
fi refi ghters discriminates against women.
35. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v British Columbia (Council of Human 
Rights), [1999] 3 SCR 868, 181 DLR (4th) 385 [Grismer cited to SCR]. Here, the issue 
is whether a standard set for healthy vision unfairly discriminates against employees with 
vision impairment who can nevertheless pass the driving and road safety test required by the 
employer.
36. Gwen Brodsky, Shelagh Day & Yvonne Peters, Accommodation in the 21st Century (March 
2012) at 42, online: Canadian Human Rights Commission <http://www.chrc-ccdp.
gc.ca/pdf/accommodation_eng.pdf> [Accommodation]. Brodsky, Day, and Peters trace the 
jurisprudence on accommodation and discuss the slide back to a minimalist interpretation.
37. Multani, supra note 2. For discussions of this case, see Colleen Sheppard, “Inclusion, 
Voice, and Process-Based Constitutionalism” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 547 at 568-73 
and Sujit Choudhry, “Rights Adjudication in a Plurinational State: the Supreme Court 
of Canada, Freedom of Religion, and the Politics of Reasonable Accommodation” (2013) 
50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 575 at 602-05. Sheppard notes that, in contrast to the constitutional 
law approach, an administrative law approach to the duty to accommodate (as Justices 
Deschamps and Abella describe in their concurring opinion) requires both a process of 
dialogue and reconciliation between the parties to a dispute and consideration of the specifi c 
details of the circumstances of the case. Such an approach is part of a broader movement 
to interpret constitutional rights in ways that emphasize process, negotiation, consultation, 
and entitlement to participate in democratic governance. Whereas resolving disputes such 
as Multani through dialogue between the parties has signifi cant benefi ts, Sheppard notes the 
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about whether the school’s no-weapons policy could be adapted to accommodate 
kirpans without causing undue hardship. Th e majority of the Court agreed that 
it could. Accommodation was reasonable and could be managed with minimal 
risk to school safety as long as kirpans were enclosed in a wooden sheath, which 
was sewn inside a cloth envelope, which was in turn attached to a shoulder strap 
worn under the student’s clothing.38 Th e Court emphasized that the principle of 
accommodation helps in the realization of multicultural values by demonstrating 
“the importance that our society attaches to protecting freedom of religion and 
to showing respect for its minorities.”39 Th en, in 2007, as a result of several 
confl icts in Quebec about the kirpan and other minority practices, the provincial 
government established the Commission on the Accommodation of Practices 
Related to Cultural Diff erences, led by Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, 
who were mandated to take stock of accommodation practices, consult extensively, 
and formulate recommendations to ensure that current accommodation practices 
conform to Quebec’s core values.40 
In each of the foregoing contexts, the principal idea behind reasonable 
accommodation is that treating individuals equally requires sensitivity to 
their diff erences, including diff erences related to their identities. Reasonable 
accommodation is a means of recognizing that norms and rules can unintention-
ally disadvantage minorities by reproducing worldviews and values specifi c to the 
majority culture—worldviews and values that refl ect the historical struggles of 
majorities and sometimes of groups with which majorities have historically 
interacted. Even if laws today do not exclude, a priori, any group or individual, 
they can nonetheless lead to discrimination on the basis of specifi c features of 
identity such as gender, religious belief, cultural practice, and physical disability. 
It follows that strict application of legislation and regulations will not guarantee 
fairness. In their report, Bouchard and Taylor explain that the appropriate measure 
of fairness and equality is one that reconciles the rules with the diff erences among 
people and thereby attempts to ensure that all people have equal access to the 
public sphere, including to employment, housing, and public services, in full 
light of their diff erences.41 So from the perspective of accommodation, the solu-
tion to seemingly neutral rules that can nonetheless disadvantage some groups 
risk, also discussed here, that resolutions may be conservative in the sense that they will not 
disrupt the status quo and may fall short of achieving substantive equality and inclusiveness.
38. Multani, supra note 2 at para 8.
39. Ibid at para 79.
40. Building the Future, supra note 2.
41. Ibid at 161.
(2013) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL624
unintentionally is to adjust the rules to accommodate the diff erence. Th is means 
that the aim of reasonable accommodation is not to abandon the rule but to 
mitigate its discriminatory eff ects by making provision for an exception to the 
rule or for a specifi c adaptation of it.
Yet, despite the proposed aim of accommodation being to adapt existing 
rules and institutions in order to eliminate discrimination and inequality, this 
framework can fall well short of embracing genuine equality. One reason for 
this is that the reasonable accommodation framework has been interpreted 
as endorsing the idea that majority rules are basically sound even though they 
sometimes have to be altered in order to accommodate those whose practices are 
outside the norm. Th e presumption that the law is sound can seem endemic to the 
framework of accommodation and is facilitated by how reasonable accommodation 
positions the law in relation to culture. Th e law is neutral, fl exible, and adaptable to 
cultural diff erence as long as those diff erences are reasonable. In this way, the law 
stands apart from culture. As Benjamin Berger explains it, advocates of reasonable 
accommodation envision that the law “sits in a managerial role” where it is used 
to decide whether or not the state can remain indiff erent to cultural diff erence.42 
On Berger’s view, the law remains indiff erent to cultural diff erence as long as 
minority conduct is considered “reasonable” or not so diff erent as to pose serious 
challenges to “the organizing norms, commitments, practices and symbols of the 
Canadian constitutional rule of law.”43 But in cases where the law cannot remain 
indiff erent, it must deem minority conduct intolerable and thereby unreasonable. 
Either way, on Berger’s view, the law risks nothing of itself when confronted by 
cultural diff erence. It positions itself above culture and, from this vantage, is 
shielded from scrutiny as to whether it provides the basis for genuine equality.
When legal accommodation shields the law in the way that Berger suggests, 
the framework appears to condone the failure of dominant groups to design laws 
that are inclusive in meaningful ways and further disincentivizes genuine inclusion 
by permitting passage of laws that exclusively refl ect dominant interests as long 
as dominant groups are willing to adapt these laws to those who are excluded.44 
42. Benjamin L Berger, “Th e Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance” (2008) 21:2 Can JL & J 246 at 
246-47. 
43. Ibid at 259.
44. Meorin, supra note 34 at para 41. McLachlin J, as she then was, takes aim at this conservative 
tendency in legal accommodation:
Although the practical result of the conventional analysis may be that individual claimants are 
accommodated and the particular discriminatory eff ect they experience may be alleviated, the 
larger import of the analysis cannot be ignored. It bars courts and tribunals from assessing the 
legitimacy of the standard itself.
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Th e law is unlikely to refl ect genuine equality when majorities have no incentive 
to transform exclusive laws and when minorities, who are disadvantaged by the 
law, are co-opted by the prospects of accommodation in the majority’s legal 
framework. Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day explained in 1996 (in the context 
of employment accommodation) that the accommodation framework prevents 
majorities from confronting
the way institutions and relations must be changed in order to make them available, 
accessible, meaningful and rewarding for the many diverse groups of which our society 
is composed. … We make some concessions to those who are “diff erent”, rather than 
abandoning the idea of “normal” and working for genuine inclusiveness.45 
Whereas the framework may be intended as a corrective for unjust, exclusive 
laws, it often creates conditions that perpetuate exclusion by undermining the 
incentives for minorities to demand truly inclusive laws and for majorities to 
design inclusive laws.
Perhaps even more seriously, reasonable accommodation can further entrench 
the power of dominant groups by requiring accommodation only to the degree 
that it is reasonable and does not cause the majority undue hardship.46 In eff ect, 
this means that the more fundamental a rule or norm is to the dominant group’s 
way of doing things, the less likely accommodation will appear to be reasonable 
even if it causes minorities serious disadvantage. Th e lessons that can be drawn from 
actual cases of accommodation show, for instance, that the costs of accommodating 
those who are unfairly excluded vary considerably depending on the degree to which 
prevailing norms and governing rules have been exclusive of cultural, religious, 
gendered, and other forms of diff erence. For instance, it is one thing to accom-
modate an employee who believes Friday to be a day of rest and wishes to be 
absent from work on that day, and quite another for a business to accommodate 
an employee who requires wheelchair access in an inaccessible workplace, or for a 
business partnership to accommodate an employee who requires maternity leave 
for an extended period of time. Whereas these examples are similar in that they 
illustrate how the design of rules and institutions can impede the realization of 
equality, they diff er with regard to the degree of hardship they cause an employer, 
and they illustrate that sometimes accommodation is expensive or requires a 
fundamental transformation of existing arrangements because institutions and 
45. Shelagh Day & Gwen Brodsky, “Th e Duty to Accommodate: Who Will Benefi t?” (1996) 
75:3 Can Bar Rev 433 at 462.
46. An approach that required comparing how much each side in a case about accommodation 
had to adapt was suggested by Chief Justice Dickson in the context of Bhinder, but Dickson’s 
approach was not adopted in the majority’s decision. See ibid at 439; Bhinder, supra note 32.
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rules have been so thoroughly designed in socially exclusionary ways. And yet 
only if accommodation is interpreted in a way that draws into question disputed 
standards, rather than merely assessing the hardship to mainstream groups, can 
it possibly be used to dismantle discrimination and transform rather than tinker 
with socially exclusionary rules. As Justice McLachlin (as she then was) wrote 
in Meiorin, in the absence of legal interpretation that aims at transforming the 
disputed standard:
Th e right to be free from discrimination is reduced to a question of whether the 
‘mainstream’ can aff ord to confer proper treatment on those adversely aff ected, within 
the confi nes of its existing formal standard. If it cannot, the edifi ce of systemic 
discrimination receives the law’s approval. Th is cannot be right.47 
With a view to justice, the presence of undue hardship can be a poor test of 
whether accommodation is unreasonable and, instead, may indicate the degree 
to which the dominant group’s position of power is written into the way that 
social institutions work or are viewed as working well.48 Th e framework of 
legal accommodation can thereby be interpreted in a manner that preserves 
dominant norms.49 
So whereas the aim of reasonable accommodation is to prevent social exclusion 
by ensuring that minorities can participate in the public sphere fully and as equals, 
without having to choose between their religious and cultural commitments and 
where they work or choose to live, the practical eff ects of accommodation may 
shield the status quo from deeper kinds of scrutiny that can reveal injustice and 
bias built into the structural foundations of current institutions. Th e dilemma 
for minorities created by reasonable accommodation is whether to advance claims 
that force majorities to adapt, albeit in modest ways, to the commitments and 
practices important to the minority’s identity or to engage in struggles for the 
47. Meiorin, supra note 34 at para 42. See also Grismer, supra note 35 at para 19. Th e ideals 
spelled out by Justice McLachlin (as she then was) in these two earlier decisions have been 
reiterated by the Court. See Moore v British Columbia (Ministry of Education), 2012 SCC 61 
at paras 61-62, 351 DLR (4th) 451.
48. Young off ers a discussion of the construction of merit as a social exclusionary value. See Iris 
Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Diff erence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990) at 200-06.
49. A more conservative interpretation of reasonable accommodation is also refl ected in legal 
argumentation that establishes the grounds for accommodation on the basis of comparator 
group analysis, which has the eff ect of entrenching dominant group norms as the standards 
against which minority practices are assessed. See Accommodation, supra note 36 at 33-36, fn 
104.
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wholesale transformation of existing institutions, which can be more diffi  cult and 
less likely to succeed.
Both the identity approach and reasonable accommodation hold out the 
promise of being useful in tracing social exclusion and responding to injustice 
suff ered by minorities. Ideally, both approaches illuminate what it means to treat 
individuals as equals, with equal dignity and respect, in full recognition of their 
identity-based diff erences. But, in practice, the approaches carry considerable 
risks. One risk is that legal decision makers will apply their own conservative 
attitudes—or the conservative norms and values found in the law—thereby 
essentializing identities, deepening harmful stereotypes, and entrenching elite 
power within minority groups. A second risk is that, within a framework of 
accommodation, identity claims can strengthen dominant groups’ norms as the 
standards against which minority accommodation is assessed, thereby shielding 
dominant practices from serious interrogation. Together, these two risks suggest 
that, as a potential site of identity politics, the Charter can be used to perpetuate 
cultural domination and elite power rather than advancing the legitimate claims 
of minorities for just social change. 
To summarize, many of the above-cited studies of the social, political, and 
legal processes that underlie the mobilization of groups on the basis of identity show 
that the real-world manifestations of identity politics can deepen the vulnerability of 
minority groups and subvert the potential of identity approaches to advance just 
aims. Unsurprisingly, some of these studies conclude that identity politics and 
identity-based claims are too risky in real-world settings to provide an adequate 
basis to advance the equal and just treatment of minority groups.50 Despite the 
promise of theories of recognition and accommodation to advance democratic 
citizenship and human rights, the concern is that these benefi ts are often lost 
when identity claims are translated into legal argumentation, court decisions, and 
political decision making. According to this view, political and legal institutions as 
well as models of analysis and decision making should be designed to discourage—
rather than encourage or facilitate—identity politics and claims making.
Whereas the risks of identity-based claims are important and serious, the 
conclusion that identity politics ought to be suppressed or that institutions should 
discourage political and legal claims that are framed in terms of identity is unrealistic 
and unwarranted, perhaps especially in relation to Charter adjudication and 
50. Whereas this conclusion is implicitly suggested by many studies, Phillips draws it explicitly. 
See Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture, supra note 5. In relation to the use of the 
concept of identity in political analysis, see Rogers Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, “Beyond 
‘identity’” (2000) 29:1 Th eor & Soc 1.
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Canadian politics. Identity politics is, after all, neither a new nor a transient kind 
of politics in Canada; rather, it is woven into the very political fabric of the country 
and its history of settlement and dispossession, nation building, federalism, 
immigration, and religious pluralism.51 Th roughout Canadian history, minorities 
have mobilized on the basis of religious, linguistic, ethnic, racial, and Indigenous 
identity to wage political struggles and to secure protection and resources from 
the state. In some cases, groups have enjoyed considerable success.52 But in many 
cases their grievances have not been fully resolved, so there is no reason to 
suppose that these claims are going away any time soon. Th e question to ask is 
not whether Canadian public institutions should respond to identity claims, 
but rather how they can respond to the legitimate grievances that are advanced 
through these claims while avoiding some of the problems that can accompany this 
kind of politics. 
Another reason to resist broad condemnations of identity politics is that such 
risks as essentialism, elite manipulation, and co-optation are not unique to identity 
politics or to decision making that facilitates identity-based claiming. For 
instance, the risk that judges and legislators will deploy narrow and stereotypical 
understandings of identities in their decisions is neither a novel nor a more serious 
problem today than it was fi fty or one hundred years ago when, for example, 
policy makers portrayed Indigenous people as child-like, savage, and uncivilized 
in order to justify assimilatory policies, or when racist stereotypes were used to 
establish a set of “colour-coded” legal precepts.53 Well before a time when identity-
based rights were legally recognized and accommodated, public decision makers 
51. From debates over the “fragment theories of political culture” to the more recent studies 
of Canadian constitutionalism’s “deep diversity,” “reimagined community,” “strange 
multiplicity,” “multicultural citizenship,” and “social citizenship,” iconic works about 
Canadian law and politics have attempted to grapple with Canada’s identity-based 
multiplicity. See e.g. G Horowitz, “Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An 
Interpretation,” (1966) 32:2 Can J Econ & Pol Sc 143; Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 
supra note 6; Taylor, supra note 6; Tully, supra note 6; Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada: 
Language, Culture, Community, and the Canadian Constitution (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1994).
52. Studies that document the successful mobilization of groups to advance Charter rights on the 
basis of identity claims include Alexandra Dobrowlosky, Th e Politics of Pragmatism: Women, 
Representation and Constitutionalism in Canada (Don Mills: Oxford University Press Canada, 
2000); Matt James, Misrecognized Materialists: Social Movements in Canadian Constitutional 
Politics (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006); Miriam Smith, Lesbian and Gay Rights in Canada: 
Social Movements and Equality-Seeking, 1971–1995 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1999); Vanhala, supra note 18.
53. See e.g. Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada 1900–
1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
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entrenched damaging stereotypes about minorities into Canadian law. Sometimes 
they did so with the help of academic and community-based experts who had 
their own political and methodological axes to grind.54 Nor is a commitment 
by policy makers to ignore cultural or other identity-based diff erences universally 
successful at immunizing public offi  cials against distorting minority identities and 
using these distorted views to obscure policies of co-optation and assimilation.55 
Indeed, a common criticism of individual rights is that, when stripped of any 
attention to group diff erence, rights can obscure the domination of one group 
by another.56 
Similarly, courts face challenges about how to use the testimony of elite 
experts, such as religious leaders and theologians, or how to assess social scientifi c 
evidence that categorizes people on the basis of class, gender, or interest, in a 
whole range of cases in addition to those that are directly about culture, race, 
or Indigeneity. From cases about climate change to cigarette advertising, border 
disputes to human rights abuses, courts and legislatures can confront elite 
opportunism and manipulation, the need to distinguish between legitimate 
diff erences in interests, and the challenge of protecting dissenters. Th ese challenges 
are not unique to identity politics but rather are found wherever the strategic 
concerns of groups and their leaders are deployed in struggles for political 
ends. It should come as no surprise to discover that identity politics attracts 
strategic and opportunistic actors as well those who simply attempt to advance 
their interests in the most eff ective ways they can. Indeed, we should expect 
this to be true of almost any form of real-world political contestation. Th e challenges 
that are often associated with identity approaches are also problems in a wide 
variety of political and legal cases, including ones where policy makers and judges 
directly reject giving any consideration to cultural or other features of identity. To 
treat these risks as unique to identity approaches can distract us from the broader 
problems at issue and mislead us about what constitutes an eff ective strategy to 
respond to these problems. 
54. Debates about methodology in the discipline of anthropology have infamously had an 
impact on the kind of evidence that anthropologists present in cases about Indigenous legal 
claims. See Michael Asch, “Th e Judicial Conceptualization of Culture after Delgamuukw and 
Van der Peet” (2000) 5:2 Rev Const Stud (2000) 119 at 127-29. 
55. For example, Trudeau’s 1969 White Paper, which promised to extend equal rights of 
citizenship to Aboriginal peoples and in return aimed at eliminating Indigenous entitlements 
to land and self-determination, advanced assimilatory ends by denying cultural diff erence. 
Canada, Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969 (Ottawa: Ministry of 
Indian Aff airs and Northern Development, 1969).
56. See e.g. Young, supra note 48.
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II. TWO WAYS FORWARD: INSTITUTIONAL HUMILITY AND 
DEMOCRATIC SPACE 
Th e question that remains is how best to respond to the challenges and risks that 
have come to be associated with identity-based claiming and decision-making 
approaches. What practices can be developed to minimize and mitigate the 
distorting and limiting features of identity-based approaches and accommodation 
frameworks? What lessons can be drawn from Canadian experiences that are useful 
in steering a course between the risks and benefi ts of using identity as a means to 
protect Charter rights?
One of the most obvious lessons to draw from studies about the protection 
of rights in Canada is that institutions make a diff erence to the mobilization 
of identity groups and the interpretation of identity claims. Specifi cally, the 
Charter has a made a diff erence in expanding the capacities of courts and the 
willingness of judges to refl ect on the ways in which their decisions advance 
ideals of inclusiveness and group-based equality. To take one example, the 
Court’s approach to religious freedom has changed over the last thirty years 
from one that essentialized religion and openly maintained a “sectarian Christian 
ideal,” as Chief Justice Dickson described the Lord’s Day Act in 1985,57 to one 
that recognized, as the majority decision in Big M Drug Mart did, that state 
support for one religion can undermine equal democratic citizenship and signal 
the social exclusion and second-class status of adherents to other religions. Recent 
court decisions about freedom of religion have also refl ected a strong awareness 
amongst the judiciary of the potential risks of essentializing religion and indicate 
how courts struggle to avoid legally sanctifying canonical interpretations of a 
faith over the individual’s lived understandings of religious commitment;58 
nevertheless, judges feel obliged to acknowledge the important connection between 
the practices of an individual believer and those of a religious community as 
prescribed by its doctrines.59 Even legal scholars who are skeptical that judges are 
57. Big M Drug Mart, supra note 13 at para 97.
58. Two recent examples include Multani, supra note 2; and Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 
SCC 47, 2 SCR 551.
59. For example, referring to Amselem, Beaman argues
there is a sense in the judgment that, although the individual’s lived experience and practice is 
important, it must link to something that is recognizable as religion, which inevitably involves 
the sedimentation of doctrine and a group of people who adhere in one manner or another to 
that doctrine through practice.  
 Lori G Beaman, “Assessing Religious Identity in Law: Sincerity, Accommodation, and Harm” 
in Eisenberg & Kymlicka, supra note 1, 238 at 246.
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free to grapple with the normative values of collective identity and group-based 
diff erences within a framework of liberal constitutionalism nevertheless recognize 
a tension in some Charter decisions between an interpretative framework that 
recognizes the relevance of the collective- and identity-based features of culture 
and religion, and one that “collapses the focus back onto conceptions of [individual] 
autonomy and choice.”60 Th is tension suggests that the normative values associated 
with identity claims have an impact on the interpretation of Charter rights, even 
though this impact is far from uniform, nor are its implications fully developed 
in the existing decisions. 
Whereas institutions can make a diff erence, it is often not evident whether 
they can resolve tensions between diff erent dimensions of identity or whether 
resolving these kinds of tensions is even legally feasible or politically desirable. 
Given the kinds of values often at stake in cases involving identity claims, it may 
be that courts, although often called upon to assess the validity of identity claims, 
are the wrong kinds of institutions to resolve the dilemmas that typically follow 
from them. Th is seems especially apparent in contexts in which the norms of 
transparency and accountability are weak, in which members of the judiciary are 
heavily drawn from the elites of dominant groups so that their decisions are more 
likely to refl ect the concerns of these elites or the concerns of dominant publics 
who are anxious about the impact of recognizing and accommodating minorities. 
For those who take the view that courts are driven by narrow concerns about 
protecting their own legitimacy or privilege,61 are unduly infl uenced by the 
political and strategic concerns of legislative elites, or take their direction from 
self-seeking interest groups,62 the potential for judges to critically refl ect on the 
values that ought to guide a normatively defensible assessment of identity claims 
will appear unrealizable. But in most democratic contexts, such sweeping and 
skeptical views about how courts work are unrealistic. Public institutions are not 
so monolithic. Th ey interact with each other and with other organizations and 
groups, all of which have diff erent aims and many of which work at cross-purposes 
to each other in ways that can have an impact on the direction of political and 
60. Berger, supra note 42 at 277.
61. For instance, some legal scholarship argues that institutional legitimacy is a central concern of 
the Supreme Court of Canada and a leading infl uence on the direction of judicial decisions. 
See e.g. Vuk Radmilovic, “Strategic Legitimacy Cultivation at the Supreme Court of Canada: 
Quebec Secession Reference and Beyond” (2010) 43:4 Can J Pol Sci 843.
62. See in particular FL Morton & Rainer Knopff , Th e Charter Revolution & the Court Party 
(Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2000); Ian Brodie, Friends of the Court: Th e Privileging 
of Interest Group Litigants in Canada (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002).
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legal decision making.63 Forms of identity politics that serve legitimate and 
desirable human rights ends can be viewed as a threat to economic projects or 
to the electoral objectives of sitting governments. And legal actors, even if they 
are drawn from similar social groups, hold a variety of diff erent sympathies and 
motives that lead them to pursue diff erent aims in their professions. Th ese 
factors alone can make legal decision making unpredictable. At a more principled 
level, legal reasoning is open to critical refl ection, and judges are obligated by 
constitutional principles to refl ect on whether the principles they apply treat the 
diversity of citizens as equal in real-world contexts. Th erefore, the potential exists 
for judicial forums to play a creative and leading role in developing principled 
guidelines for distinguishing between identity claims that advance core values of 
justice and human rights and those that jeopardize these values. Whether this 
potential can be realized depends, in part, on whether public decision makers are 
willing to counteract the risks of identity politics. When they lack the incentives or, 
indeed, work in ways that entrench forms of essentialism and co-optation, identity 
politics will be riven with problems. But when institutional actors are subject to 
appropriate forms of accountability and transparency, and when minorities may 
challenge how their identities are being characterized, the potential exists for 
institutional actors to counteract distortions such as essentialism, co-optation, 
and social exclusion in order to identify and address legitimate grievances that 
identity claims raise. 
A. INSTITUTIONAL HUMILITY 
To imagine how this might be possible, it is worth considering two frameworks 
for thinking about policies that can enhance the capacities of public decision 
makers to address legitimate grievances while minimizing the risks of identity 
politics.64 Th e fi rst framework includes policies that engender “institutional 
humility,” or the capacity of public institutions to refl ect on their own limitations 
and develop avenues that can overcome narrow and faulty interpretations of 
63. For instance, dialogue approaches map various ways in which courts and legislatures 
infl uence each other despite holding diff erent motivations and aims. See Peter W Hogg 
& Allison A Bushell, “Th e Charter Dialogue Between the Courts and the Legislatures (Or 
Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Th ing After All)” (1997) 35:1 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 75. Pluralists have also traced the trajectory of decision making contexts where courts and 
legislatures infl uence each other while often seeming to work at cross purposes. See Robert A 
Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: Th e Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker” 
(1957) 6 J Pub L 279. 
64. Th ese frameworks are, admittedly, broadly sketched here, are underdeveloped, and are the 
subject of my ongoing research.
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principles, rules, and procedures. For example, policies that aim to diversify the 
judiciary by recruiting women, Indigenous peoples, and members of under-
represented minority groups into the judicial ranks display institutional humility 
insofar as they refl ect an attentiveness to the ways in which a diversity of experiences 
and circumstances can generate diff erent legitimate perspectives on how the 
abstract principles of constitutional and other forms of law translate in practical 
terms and diverse contexts. Instead of treating diff erence as something that can 
fl ourish only in the private domain, recruitment programs that aim to diversify 
decision makers establish methods by which the manifestations of diff erence can 
be confronted.65 At the same time, the presence of diff erent voices enhances the 
capacity of courts to identify and (one hopes) to avoid entrenching stereotypes or 
essentializing minority groups. Th e aim, as the word “humility” indicates, is to 
call attention to the contextual and “on-the-ground” factors that should inform legal 
and political decision making if the values protected by abstract rights are going 
to be eff ectively translated into the real-world circumstances in which people lead 
their lives. 
Institutional humility may also include policies that motivate judges to 
adopt disciplined methods to acknowledge the partiality of the law and legal 
principles and to reassess legal norms in light of circumstances of known and 
yet-to-be-known complexity and diversity while paying special attention to those 
who have been excluded and disadvantaged.66 In this regard, institutional 
reforms that encourage public decision makers to be open to the limitations 
of past decisions, processes, and rules, and to be attentive to the diversity of 
experiences and circumstances in which principles apply, can display institutional 
humility. Such reforms could, for instance, create opportunities for members of 
the public to intervene in constitutional adjudication by presenting briefs that 
represent points of view not fully understood or considered by the judiciary. 
In the decade following the introduction of the Charter, the Supreme Court 
expanded the opportunities for intervenors to present briefs in constitutional 
cases and, since that time, the number of cases in which intervenors participate 
has steadily grown, with Charter cases attracting the most interventions.67 
Intervenors can bring an important measure of transparency and accountability 
65. See Anne Phillips, Th e Politics of Presence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 1-27.
66. In the context of scientifi c problem solving about complex issues such as climate change, 
Sheila Jasanoff  identifi es the aims of what she calls technologies of humility. “Technologies of 
Humility” (2007) 450:7166 Nature 33.
67. Benjamin RD Alarie & Andrew J Green, “Interventions at the Supreme Court of Canada: 
Accuracy, Affi  liation, and Acceptance” (2010) 48:3 & 4 Osgoode Hall LJ 381 at 398.
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to otherwise non-participatory processes and their participation can serve as an 
eff ective means by which identity groups can challenge narrow or stereotypical 
ways in which their identities are characterized. At the same time, each intervenor 
represents only a partial and limited perspective on an issue; therefore the risk is 
that intervenors will merely displace one kind of bias for another. In short, 
intervenors can engender institutional humility, especially where they enhance the 
courts’ understanding of the potential impact of their decisions on a community; 
at the same time, their participation in decision making carries risks and can 
marginalize points of view relevant to the case at hand. Th is risk points to the 
inevitable partiality of decision making, no matter how expansive and inclusive. 
Th ough institutional humility, as a policy ideal, can create a disposition and an 
awareness that allow decision makers to be more open to the complexities of 
decision making in diverse societies and to be motivated to address those 
complexities fairly, it is not be a panacea for poor decision making. 
B. DEMOCRATIC SPACE
Whereas the framework of institutional humility includes policies that create 
incentives for courts to develop internal methods of decision making that are more 
attentive to the risks of identity-based claiming, the framework of democratic space 
includes innovations that look beyond the courts for external means to identify 
and respond to legitimate identity claims. Sometimes the best way to avoid the 
risks associated with identity-based claiming is to strengthen democratic spaces 
where people can contest how their identities are being defi ned. Th e framework 
of democratic space includes policies that harness the mobilizing power of identity 
politics while subjecting identity groups to democratic accountability, transparency, 
and inclusiveness. Th e risks that identity-based claiming will entrench stereotypes, 
elite hierarchies, and narrow and distorted understandings of group-based beliefs and 
commitments are greatest when people are unable to challenge inherited categories, 
canonical interpretations, and elite-inspired scripts about what their identity 
consists of. Judges, bureaucrats, and legislators may be less inclined to lend credence 
to stereotypes about a group if they are confronted with evidence about the 
diverse and pluralistic nature of group values and the hybridity of group members. 
A framework of policies that creates democratic space aims at enhancing the 
capacities of public institutions to identify circumstances in which mechanisms 
of consultation, deliberation, and intra- or inter-community participation can be 
useful in providing information about groups and the often contested meaning 
of their practices.
In Canada, democratic space of this general sort has been successfully 
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created by some commissions of inquiry, including the 2004 Boyd Commission 
on religious arbitration in Ontario68 and the 2009 Bouchard–Taylor Commission 
on Reasonable Accommodation,69 both of which have been helpful at identifying 
identity claims and the risks associated with them. Courts and legislatures can 
enhance democratic space by taking special notice of community-based solutions 
to disputes that display fi delity to broad and inclusive forms of participation and 
thereby strengthen attempts by citizens to sort out confl icts in a manner consistent 
with democratic values.70 Democratic space can also be bolstered through initiatives 
that require governments to consult communities when legal or political decisions 
are likely to aff ect the community’s organization, practices, and commitments. A 
formal legal duty to consult is recognized in relation to government policies and 
land-use projects that aff ect Indigenous communities.71 When land use projects 
have proceeded without adequate consultation, courts have found the government 
in violation of its procedural obligations and are, in principle, willing to rescind 
approval for these projects.72 
Much like identity politics itself, eff orts by courts to enhance democratic 
spaces can lead to other challenges, not least of which is the need to establish 
criteria for what counts as meaningful consultation. Similarly, if courts are going 
to have a role in enhancing democratic spaces and processes, they need guidelines 
for what constitutes legitimate democratic space. Th ese guidelines are especially 
important where the parties to a dispute have unequal power, causing one party 
to be less eff ective at advancing its interests. Th e likelihood that such inequalities 
will characterize most democratic spaces points to one of the risks of addressing 
68. Boyd, supra note 2.
69. Building the Future, supra note 2. 
70. See e.g. Regina (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School, [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 AC 100. 
Here, the House of Lords endorsed the decision of the Governors of Denbigh High School 
to restrict a female student, Sabina Begum, from wearing a veil, known as a jilbab, to school 
instead of the school uniform. Th e Court noted that the school’s dress code, which allowed 
some kinds of veils but not the jilbab, was developed after broad consultation with parents, 
students, staff , and the Imams of the three local mosques. Also see Anver M Emon, “Islamic 
Law and the Canadian Mosaic: Politics, Jurisprudence, and Multicultural Accommodation” 
(2008) 87 Can Bar Rev 391 at 422-25. Anver Emon shows how legal recognition could 
have enhanced democratic dialogue in relation to disputes about religious arbitration. Emon 
argues that legal recognition of religious arbitration could be structured to create multiple 
Muslim family service organizations with competing visions of Islamic law some or all of 
which have incentives to enter into dialogue with the state. His vision is, in these respects, 
consistent with a vision of how policies create democratic space.
71. See Sheppard, supra note 37. 
72. See Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 20 05 SCC 69 at 
paras 57, 68, 3 SCR 388.
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identity claims using an approach that rests solely on resolving confl icts through 
democratic mechanisms—namely that democratic solutions will favour dominant 
interests and can marginalize minorities. And yet this risk is much greater where 
no democratic space exists for minorities to contest identity claims. In short, 
democratic space may be necessary, even if it is not a suffi  cient condition for 
responding to identity claims fairly and in ways that can best advance their 
normative value while mitigating some of the risks that accompany them. 
III. CONCLUSION
Legal and political scholars, within and outside Canada, have pointed to the 
rights entrenched in Canada’s Charter to illustrate how the recognition of 
identity can be deployed in the service of justice. Some of the Charter’s provisions 
are sensitive to identity. Th ese provisions have the potential to help courts address 
structural injustice and to track discrimination against women, gay and lesbian 
individuals, individuals with disabilities, Indigenous peoples, as well as linguistic, 
cultural, and religious minorities. Th e hope that follows from an optimistic view 
is that the constitutional recognition of identity categories will mobilize groups 
to advance claims for the recognition and protection of their identity and 
motivate courts and other public institutions to develop capacities to refl ect on 
these claims in a transparent and accountable manner. In this way, the hope is 
that Charter rights can become eff ective in advancing Canada’s commitment to 
the values embodied in human rights in the age of diversity.  
And yet, we can see that, in real-world settings, identity-based claiming is 
often accompanied by serious risks such as the risk that group identities will be 
essentialized and stereotyped, that elite power will become entrenched through 
decisions that legally validate patriarchal or other inegalitarian cultural and 
religious practices, and that eff orts to accommodate minorities will end up 
off ering only modest and tokenistic kinds of recognition and protection that, 
paradoxically, strengthen dominant group norms. In the real world, identity-
based claims cannot be divorced from these and other features of the strategic 
politics of identity. Whereas identity claims are grounded in normative values 
that can be helpful in advancing equality, human rights, democratic citizenship, 
and respect for minority groups, it is not possible to divorce the strategic from 
the normative features of this form of politics—or, for that matter, of any form 
of politics. Instead, public institutions have to develop capacities to mitigate the 
risks and maximize the benefi ts of identity, as well as other forms of politics—
which is, after all, what they ought to be designed to do.
